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"Shakespeare, idealism, and universals: The significance of recent work on the 
mind" by Gabriel Egan 
For most the twentieth century, the serious study of Shakespeare's works was 
founded on a general acceptance of the principles of Platonic idealism and 
essentialism, and a belief in the existence of universals. In textual criticism, the New 
Bibliography that emerged from the work of A. J. Pollard, W. W. Greg, and R. B. 
McKerrow in the first decades of the century assumed a relatively unproblematic 
application of Platonic idealism for the relationship between the play as conceived in 
the mind of the dramatist and the play as performed or written down. Since the 
1980s idealism, essentialism, and universals have become dirty words as the New 
Historicism and Cultural Materialism popularized an unthinking association between 
these philosophical principles and political conservatism. In these new and related 
schools, the alleged antidote to all three evils was said to be materialism, which 
meant paying more attention to the physical (often the economic) realities of a 
system under consideration than to the ideas in it. In respect of the textual condition 
of Shakespeare's plays, this meant attending to the material particularities of the 
early quarto and Folio texts rather than seeking to extrapolate back from those to a 
lost authorial manuscript that preceded them or, worse still, to whatever it is 
Shakespeare had 'in mind' when he composed them. 
    Under this new intellectual dispensation, materialism was displayed as a badge of 
pride, a way of appearing to be tough and pragmatic by talking about the degree to 
which literature was (albeit covertly) really about money, matter, and production 
rather than love, ideas, and self-reflection. This was a curious development, since 
the particular kind of materialism the New Historicists and Cultural Materialists 
professed to practice was the nineteenth-century philosophical materialism best 
known through the works of Karl Marx. Ironically, far from rejecting ideas and 
valorizing harsh realities, Marx's materialism was an abiding concern for how ideas 
arise from material circumstances. To assert, as Marx did, that social being does not 
arise from consciousness but rather consciousness arises from social being is not to 
leave ideas out of the matter but to insist that they are the mysterious phenomena 
that are in need of an explanation rather than simply popping in existence to account 
for the way the world is. Finding a plausible account of the relationship between the 
hard facts of existence and the nebulous realm of ideas was a problem that dogged 
the twentieth-century refiners of Marxist determinism, notably Georg Lukács, Antonio 
Gramsci, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Louis Althusser (whose 
approaches are admirably summarized by Eagleton 1991, 33-159), which tradition 
continues most exhileratingly, although as yet without a solution, in the work of 
Slavoj Žižek (1989). 
    In analyzing cultures from the past (especially the early-modern period), New 
Historicism in particular drew upon a fresh approach from outside the Marxist 
tradition, articulated by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz who influentially 
characterized culture as essentially a literary phenomenon. According to Geertz, 
symbolic forms are the key to social behaviours--we must always ask 'what does this 
activity mean to these people?'--and the tools for reading culture are essentially 
literary-critical, not scientific. In an early and much anthologized essay, Geertz 
argued that Enlightenment science's approach to investigating the nature of 
humanity was to assume that like other phenomena (planetary motions, chemical 
reactions) this one would have universal principles underlying its apparent 
heterogeneity, and that finding these universals, this human nature, was the project 
for anthropology (Geertz 1965). Rejecting this, Geertz insisted that culture itself 
made people what they are, for it was "a set of control mechanisms--plans, recipes, 
rules, instructions . . . --for the governing of behavior", needed because humans are 
uniquely lost without such an "extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanism" 
(Geertz 1965, 107). In his most famous articulation of what follows from this, Geertz 
wrote that ". . . there is no such thing as a human nature independent of culture" 
(Geertz 1965, 112). 
    Geertz's primary evidence for this claim was that modern humans differ from their 
predecessor primates markedly in brain capacity and little else and that until a great 
deal of learning has been done a newborn human is not ready to survive unaided. 
Moreover, it was not that humans emerged and then became clever enough to have 
culture, but that culture (tool-making, collaborative hunting, and so on) slowly 
emerged among the primates and gradually turned Australopithecus into us. This 
account is itself not greatly controversial, but Geertz had a habit of drawing pithy 
conclusions that could be misread as overstatements of his case. A typical example 
is his claim that by "submitting" to culture "man determined, if unwittingly, the 
culminating stages of his own biological destiny. Quite literally, though quite 
inadvertently, he created himself" (Geertz 1965, 111). Clearly, Geertz had difficulty 
assigning agency here. Humankind is said to "submit" to culture as an outside force 
and yet to be made up by it. Greertz conceived culture and biology as mutually 
interactive and presumably mutually determining, since no amount of creative 
invention could produce tools that proto-human biology could not wield. 
    When, at the birth of New Historicism, Stephen Greenblatt repeated Geertz's 
assertion that there is no human nature independent of culture (Greenblatt 1980, 3), 
academics whose subject was literary culture found themselves thrillingly located in 
a central position after years of marginality within social science. If human nature 
were not a given but a product of culture then existing critical methodologies 
concerned with how literature illuminates or reflects the human condition had missed 
the point. Might not literature itself be constructing our sense of what it is to be 
human while seeming only to represent it? If so, it was performing the work of 
ideology as theorized in Marxism. An enlarged role for literary studies as a branch of 
social science and politics coincided with an ascent to orthodoxy of cultural relativism 
that offered the possibility of partially undoing the harm of European ethnocentrism. 
The cost of these developments for the study of literature has been high. Literary 
students most commonly encounter linguistics via the outmoded structuralism of 
Ferdinand de Saussure, which gives priority to language itself as an outside-the-skin 
system of signification, and empirical developments in the second half of the century 
(such as Noam Chomsky's widely-accepted view that humans have an innate skill for 
a universal grammar of which particular languages are only instances) are generally 
under-appreciated in English departments. The dogma of anti-essentialism has 
driven a wedge between English studies and most scientific approaches to the 
human condition and has blinded literary scholars to what is being discovered about 
the qualities that humans really do share simply by virtue of being human. Moreover, 
there are startling insights about just how much of what we call culture (including 
such things as ethics, politics, and play) is common also among the more 
intellectually advanced animals. 
    While Geertz may be sympathetically read as indicating that culture has 
embedded itself deeply in human existence, he is more commonly used to assert 
simply that human nature itself does not exist and that there are no universals. As 
Bertrand Russell pointed out, we all believe in universals of some sort else we could 
not accept the truth of a geometrical proof. The opening premiss "Let ABC be a 
rectilinear triangle" rests on our acceptance that although any triangle we might draw 
to illustrate the proof will necessarily be imperfect (we cannot draw absolutely 
straight and infinitely thin lines), the principles of how imaginarily perfect objects 
behave are easily understood and moreover are objectively true (Russell 1946, 146). 
We do not allow our experience of measuring a hand-drawn triangle's interior angles 
and summing them to 179.5 degrees to deflect us from the principle that with 
perfectly straight lines the angles would (indeed, must) sum to 180 degrees. Rather 
than being a common feature of a collection of disparate objects (as with the human 
universal of smiling to present a non-threatening demeanour), this kind of universal 
is more like the Ideal or Form described by Plato in The Republic and The Timaeus 
in having no material manifestation and yet embodying a truth. Despite this benign 
meaning, many materialists habitually reject Platonic thinking on principle. 
    Both kinds of universal are unfashionable in modern literary studies, being widely 
suspected as merely camouflages for conservative and illiberal values. To suggest 
that all human beings share discoverable common traits can seem reminiscent of the 
ethnocentricism of much nineteenth-century anthropology in which non-European 
cultures were chauvinistically measured by the degree to which had acquired 
European attributes that were deemed universal. To suggest that Platonic idealism 
might be a useful way to approach the relationship between a play and its physical 
embodiment as scripts and performances was for a long time usual in textual studies 
(it was the standard model in New Bibliography), but is now routinely dismissed as 
essentialism. Indeed, it is an essentialist model of textuality, but this only seems 
problematic when all forms of essentialism are rejected out of hand without 
reasonable cause. A strict anti-essentialist would have to argue that Shakespeare's 
plays (or indeed anybody else's) cannot be translated into another language, since 
translation is predicated on the assumption that there exists an essence of the play 
that stands apart not only from its manuscript and printed texts but also from the 
particular words written by the dramatist. This essay will argue that essentialism and 
Platonic idealism are reasonable ways to think about the various manifestations of a 
play, as performance, as written script, and as originating ideas in the mind of the 
dramatist. As any materialist must accept, ideas have a basis in the organization of 
matter in the human mind--ideas are to that extent physically real--and the new 
scientific studies of consciousness (especially memetics and various models of 
cognition) show that the Platonic analogy provides a good way to conceptualize the 
distinction between the play as abstract (but nonetheless material and somewhat 
embodied) thought and its various further embodiments in manuscript and print 
textualisations and as performances. 
Dualism and the Intentional Stance 
    In his Meditationes de Prima Philosophia (Meditations on First Philosophy), Rene 
Descartes responded to the radical scepticism of those such as Michel de Montaigne 
by asserting that while one could doubt the accuracy of one's sensory experiences, 
and hence doubt the existence of the world (including one's body) known from those 
experiences, one could not doubt the existence of the thinking mind that was, in that 
moment, doing the doubting (Descartes 1641). The thinking mind, at least, had to 
exist, and for Descartes this special status set the mind off from the rest of the body 
and the wider universe, all of which was made from matter; the mind, for Descartes, 
had to be immortal and (in his terminology) unextended and impossible to fragment. 
This is the essence of Cartesian dualism, dividing the material body from the 
immaterial (and unified) mind. Most people report that their mind does indeed feel 
unitary and immaterial (quite distinct from the body it inhabits), and when asked to 
consider its physical location in the brain many of us respond that it seems as though 
the sensory perceptions of the body were being delivered to a single, central 
location--a command centre--where the visual images are played on a screen and 
the sounds delivered through loudspeakers for the benefit of the real self operating 
the controls. The Cartesian model suffers the distinct problem of infinite regression: 
how does the inner self watching the screen and listening to the speakers gain its 
consciousness, unless we posit yet another smaller homuncule inside the first, and 
so on? The dualism of the Cartesian mind/body distinction seems to exert a powerful 
grasp on the way we think about ourselves, even though most people when pushed 
will accede that it cannot actually be true. It is certainly difficult to see how there 
could be an interface between the body and an immaterial spirit such that the latter 
could control the former. On reflection, materialists tend to agree with Gilbert Ryle 
that there can be no 'ghost in the machine' and that the mind is the name we give for 
the collection of activities that the brain, and the body of which it is a part, collectively 
perform (Ryle 1949). 
    It may be that the dualist habit is hard to discard because it has served an 
evolutionary purpose, for it allows us to treat the environment around us as full of 
intentions. An efficient way to make sense of how other creatures behave and to 
predict their future actions is to treat them as having purposes: a predator exist 'for' 
chasing oneself, prey exists 'for' chasing, caves exist 'for' sleeping in, and so on 
(Dennett 1987). Children are highly prone to impute purposes to objects, but adults 
do it too. In a famous experiment, Fritz Heider and Mary-Ann Simmel showed a 
simple animated film of a pair of triangles and a circle moving around and inside a 
box and asked viewers to report what they saw (Heider & Simmel 1944). 
Overwhelmingly, viewers constructed from the movements of these images a 
narrative of rivalry, pursuit and flight. It is as though the rational mind's acceptance 
that these are only shapes, not creatures with purposes, is overwhelmed by an 
innate predisposition to interpret certain movements as purposeful and thus to 
endow each shape with its own internal spirit. This kind of (possibly innate) benign 
dualism suits the dramatic arts. In an after-show discussion of a work-in-progress 
airing of his puppet-masque adaptation of Shakespeare's Venus and Adonis, 
Gregory Doran discussed the ease with which the mind treats a wooden puppet as 
though it were a living being. So convincing was the puppet Venus, Doran reported, 
that during rehearsals he found himself giving instructions directly to 'her' rather than 
the puppeteers (Shakespeare 2004). Theatre with human performers also promotes 
the habit of dualism as a mind inferred from a character's word is temporarily put in 
command of the actor's body. 
    In this we might see an inherent contradiction between emerging knowledge about 
the mind and the habits of thought that enable dramatic impersonation. We know 
that the mind is not a distinct entity apart from the body and also that it is not unitary. 
Sigmund Freud's division of the mind into conscious and unconscious parts remains 
popular in literary studies although recent research into the operations of the brain 
posits further empirically verifiable divisions, such as that between left and right 
hemispheres and between smaller specialized units. In Daniel C. Dennett's recent 
description of the mind, distinct modules in the human brain have worked more or 
less independently and unconsciously for millenia doing the important work of 
keeping us out of danger, while the illusion of a singular, conscious self arose only 
quite recently after the invention of language (Dennett 1993). Dennett's account is 
controversial among philosophers, and it puts language at the centre of its 
explanation of consciousness. Just what language itself is for remains a tricky 
anthropological question. The obvious answer might seem to be that it aids social 
cooperation, and so arose as an evolutionary innovation that enabled our ancestors 
to out-compete rival animals for the control of resources. However, our oversized 
brains (presumably needed for big thinking) are a physical disadvantage, consuming 
considerable energy even when apparently doing nothing useful for us and making 
childbirth considerably more dangerous than it would otherwise be. One of the best 
reasons for taking seriously Richard Dawkins's only half-intended invention of the 
meme, the cultural equivalent of the gene (Dawkins 1976, 189-201), is that it gives 
an explanation for this peculiar fact about our bodies. 
    As Susan Blackmore argued, a memetic pressure to increase brain size could 
have overwhelmed the genetic pressure to keep the brain small (Blackmore 1999, 
67-81). Once imitation became useful to Homo habilus, about 2.5 million years ago, 
good imitators (that is, those whose brains happened to be good at copying others' 
behaviour) benefitted from a genetic-selection pressure in reproduction. The memes 
that were imitated might be genuinely useful (the making of sharp tools or the 
fashioning of clothes) but since, once culture took off, it made good sense from a 
survival point of view to mate with good imitators in preference to poor imitators, non-
useful memes (say, for singing or decorating caves) could flourish too. At this point, 
according to Blackmore, the memes took over and were able to drive up brain size 
as if for their own ends. In fact, this view of human development had been somewhat 
anticipated by Geertz: 
The slow, steady, almost glacial growth of culture through the Ice Age altered the 
balance of selection pressures for the evolving Homo in such a way as to play a 
major directive role in his evolution. . . . [The effects of culture] all created for man a 
new environment to which he was then obliged to adapt. As culture, step by 
infinitesimal step, accumulated and developed, a selective advantage was given to 
those individuals in the population most able to take advantage of it--the effective 
hunter, the persistent gatherer, the adept toolmaker, the resourceful leader--until 
what had been a small-brained, protohuman Homo australopithecus became the 
large-brained fully human Homo sapiens. (Geertz 1965, 110-11) 
Geertz's account lacks only Blackmore's insight that once being a good copyist 
conferred a genetic advantage, the things copied need not be exclusively practical, 
since unproductive memes too could flourish in this new intellectual substrate. That 
Geertz dates this process to about 3.5 million years ago and Blackmore to about 2.5 
million years ago is irrelevant to the larger point about culture. 
    The claims that memetics makes about the origin of human physiology and culture 
have gained support from neurological science with the discovery of the mirror 
neurons, first in monkeys (Gallese et al. 1996) and then in humans (Arbib 2005). 
These neurons fire not only when we perform an activity but also when we watch 
someone else performing that same activity. They appear to be the reason that it is 
difficult to watch someone yawning or laughing without joining in, and equally why it 
is difficult to watch Lear's agony at the death of his daughter without sharing in the 
emotion. Our mirror neurons make us feel his pain even though we know we are 
watching only an imitation, and the principle seems anticipated in Hamlet's conviction 
that watching a representation of a crime is all the more acutely painful for those who 
have committed the like action. The memeticians' claim that we are merely the 
conduits for self-replicating practices and ideas may seem difficult to accept, but 
analogues of it have been common in the humanities and social sciences for some 
time. A correlative of the structuralist view of language and literature was that these 
extra-personal corpora of meaning-bearing distinctions speak, as it were, through us 
in our utterances and texts. The structuralist anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss 
identified his aim as not "to show how men think in myths but how myths think in 
men, unbeknownst to them" (Lévi-Strauss 1970, 20). Where Lévi-Strauss took up the 
process from the perspective of the myth instead of the teller, W. D. Hamilton and his 
followers such as Dawkins took up the perspective of the gene instead of the 
organism, and showed that the replicator fashions the organism to get itself copied. 
Equally, one might take up the view of the object you are holding and say that from 
the book's point of view the scholar (who researches in a library) is just a library's 
way of getting more books made. 
    Recent work on the mind and on language should be of special interest to those 
who engage with drama, since theatre is to a large extent concerned with the 
artificial construction of what seem like human minds in dialogue. We do not know 
just how realistic the theatre of Shakespeare's time aimed to be, and must not make 
the mistake of anachronistically applying twenty-first century assumptions about 
psychological plausibility to early-modern drama. Psychological approaches to acting 
such as those taught by Constantin Stanislavsky, Stella Adler and Lee Strasberg 
might well seem suitable for the portrayal of a character like Hamlet, whose unseen 
inner mental life is explicitly a part of the role. But they are scarcely useful for a 
brainless role like Rumour in 2 Henry 4 or a minimally motivated one such as the 
easily overlooked Adrian in The Tempest. But for characters that seem intended to 
be realistically human, certain insights about how the mind works throw light on 
theatrical impersonation and the construction of characters. According to F. 
Elizabeth Hart, we can see this at work when the characters themselves are 
constructing fictional realities for one another (Hart 2005). In Othello, Iago has a 
'theory of mind', a term coined by David Premack and Guy Woodruff and meaning 
the ability to impute mental states to oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff 1978). 
Children over the age of about four years are generally able to comprehend that they 
might know things that another does not and that another might hold beliefs that are 
actually false, say because that person is being tricked into believing falsehoods. 
With this 'theory of mind', a child is able accurately to predict others' behaviour even 
when deceptions are being practised. Children under the age of about four, or with 
conditions such as Downs syndrome and autism, are generally unable to make this 
distinction between the way things really are and the way that another might think 
they are (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith 1985). 
    Iago not only assumes that Othello has a mind and predicts how it will react, he 
also assumes that Othello himself has a 'theory of mind' and is trying to make sense 
of Iago's reactions. As Hart pointed out, humans are "compulsive mind-readers" and 
can be made to misread a mind by someone like Iago who is able to simulate the 
self-editing of a mind trying not to reveal itself. Othello constructs, from scraps of 
evidence, a version of Iago's mind that is self-editing to avoid being read: 
OTHELLO 
'Think, my lord?' By heaven, thou echo'st me 
As if there were some monster in thy thought 
Too hideous to be shown! . . . 
. . . 
[Thou] weigh'st thy words before thou giv'st them breath, 
Therefore these stops of thine fright me the more; 
(Othello 3.3.110-251) 
Iago only rarely lies, since he seldom needs to. Iago knows that habitually we read 
others' minds and he lets Othello misread his by dropping scraps of evidence from 
which Othello can construct the central falsehoods of the play for himself.  
Early Modern Cognition and Textual Transmission 
    The art of creating plausible impersonations of fictional humans includes, of 
course, the creation of dialogue from which the audience may infer the existence of a 
mind thinking up the lines being spoken. Indeed, the entire process of early-modern 
theatre (as opposed to merely the problem of how to act) is illuminated by recent 
work on the mind, for certain of its practices required feats of mental activity that 
seem to us prodigious. It is clear from the diary of theatre impresario Philip 
Henslowe, which lists dates and titles of performances at his playhouses, that early-
modern actors performed as many as six different plays in a week, with a new play 
entering the repertory about every two weeks. We might suppose, as Tiffany Stern 
did, that they managed this by sticking to formulas and having each man play the 
same kind of character in each play (Stern 2000). But Evelyn Tribble has suggested 
that in fact the physical and documentary mechanisms of early theatre took some of 
the burden from the individual acting mind (Tribble 2005). According to Tribble, the 
'parts', the 'plot', the conventions of movement, the company structures, and the 
theatre building itself together comprised a cognitive system that enabled a playing 
company to maintain its seemingly miraculous high-turnover repertory. In a cognitive 
approach the tools we use are not strictly distinct from the minds that use them, but 
rather the tools are part of what we think with: they are "cognitive prostheses" 
(Tribble 2005, 140). Actors did not receive the whole script of a play, only the 'part' 
containing each of one character's speeches, topped by a 'cue', the last two or three 
words of the previous speaker's speech. Thus the 'plot', a single folio sheet listing the 
scenes and who is in them, was an actor's only chance to see the whole play 
represented all-at-once, like a map, and so to see what parts he was doubling and 
how the scenes related one to another. Another prosthetic was verse speaking itself, 
since it not only helps remembering but it also conceals forgetting: a good actor can 
stay in verse even if he uses the wrong words (Tribble 2005, 150). Simple rules 
about stage movement, such as Andrew Gurr and Mariko Ichikawa's refinement of 
Bernard Beckerman's 'restaurant kitchen' rule (one door for getting 'on' and one for 
getting 'off'), make the least cognitive demands on the performer and hence are the 
most plausible of the various theories regarding staging conventions (Tribble 2005, 
143; Gurr & Ichikawa 2000). 
    A convention not discussed by Tribble but probably pertinent is the one governing 
asides and soliloquies. Humphrey Gyde showed that it is possible to construct a 
single simple rule-based convention for both forms of address, only the former of 
which (asides) were so named in early-modern theatre scripts (Gyde 1990). Gyde 
argued that the implied injunction to a character who steps onto the Renaissance 
stage is 'tell us how you feel' and in responding to this call--especially in soliloquy 
where deception is not possible--dramatic personality is created. Gyde produced an 
elegantly simple model of the audibility of asides and soliloquies that he called 
'represented awareness', and I have found no violations of it in the extant early-
modern drama. Gyde claimed that a character speaking an aside or soliloquy can, as 
it were, deafen those characters whom she knows are on the stage at the time, 
invoking the convention of deafening by taking a step towards one of the edges of 
the stage ('aside') to confide in the audience. However, a character cannot deafen 
those of whose presence she is unaware, and hence the fear of being crept upon 
shown by soliloquizers, and their explicit silencing of themselves lest the speech that 
was privileged address to the audience be overheard in the world of the play: 
[RICHARD GLOUCESTER] 
Enter George Duke of Clarence, guarded, and Sir Robert Brackenbury 
Dive, thoughts, down to my soul: here Clarence comes 
(Richard 3 1.1.41) 
[HAMLET]            . . . Soft you, now, 
The fair Ophelia! 
(Hamlet 3.1.90-1) 
BANQUO 
Thou hast it now: King, Cawdor, Glamis, all . . .  
                            . . . But hush, no more. 
Sennet sounded. Enter Macbeth as King, Lady Macbeth as Queen, Lennox, Ross, 
lords, and attendants 
(Macbeth 3.1.1-10). 
In response to these cues, and others that answer the 'tell us how you feel' 
injunction, the audience or reader infers a relatively unified and stable (albeit 
changeable) dramatic self, and as Bruce Smith showed--and Gyde independently 
confirmed--this process is most obviously logocentric (in Jacques Derrida's sense) in 
the soliloquies, and more acoustically social in the ensemble scenes (Smith 2001). 
Smith, however, was concerned with the disorder--what he called 'green' sound--that 
encroaches upon the edges of logocentric order, and did not address the more 
philosophically fundamental problem of what we are doing when we infer a character 
from its utterances. 
    Even the most postmodern of us does not feel entitled to treat what a character 
says as genuinely self-contradictory; we habitually infer coherence of mind and seek 
alternative explanations for contradiction. Take the simple problem of how many men 
Miranda thinks she has encountered before meeting Ferdinand in The Tempest. In 
an aside Miranda implicitly counts Caliban among humankind: "This [Ferdinand] | Is 
the third man that e'er I saw" (1.2.447-8). Obviously, Prospero and Caliban were the 
first and second. However, speaking to Ferdinand she excludes Caliban from the 
count: "nor have I seen | More that I may call men than you, good friend, | And my 
dear father" (3.1.50-2). Rather than treat this as a fundamental rupture in the 
coherence or consistency of the dramatic world, we quite naturally treat such 
discrepancies as examples of a singular, unified character being in possession of 
imperfect knowledge of herself, of her selfhood perhaps changing over time, and, 
whether consciously or not, of a self shaping its account of reality to suit the hearer. 
Thus, we might say that in her own mind--and presumably her near-rape is 
significant in this regard--Miranda considers Caliban a potential, albeit revolting, 
sexual partner, but she would not want Ferdinand to think so. 
    We treat ourselves as likewise partially self-divided when we say "I forced myself 
to do it", or "I did not mean it". Such moments of self-division are among the markers 
of realistic dramatic character, and this fact itself corroborates the claim that 
consciousness--in dramatic characters as much as in real people--is an overarching 
phenomenological illusion of mental continuity that sutures the differences in our 
behaviours across time and space. Thus, although I do not feel that I am wholly the 
same person I was 20 years ago, I can hardly claim to be someone else entirely; at 
the very least the law may hold me to account for what I did back then. And yet there 
is a distinct fear of such continuities in much modern criticism and theorizing about 
Shakespeare. Foucauldians such as Margreta de Grazia would have us believe that 
before the Enlightenment people were simply more comfortable than we are with the 
discontinuous, the contradictory, and hence that (to take her example) when in 
Shakespeare the same letter is read aloud twice to produce seemingly different 
words, a problem emerges for us (with our unity-loving post-Enlightenment minds) 
that simply did not exist for them (De Grazia 1991, 222-26). As I argue elsewhere, 
De Grazia misread the historical evidence and an enabling fiction of 
characterological and textual unity was as important for them as for us, and this 
should inform our textual theory (Egan 2008). At the very least, both the singularity of 
the performance script (normally only one text was licensed by the Master of the 
Revels) and, press correction notwithstanding, the singularity of the printed text, 
belie the textual multiplicities favoured by postmodernism. 
    In our current dramatic practices, we grant coherent singularity to dramatic 
characters within a single text or performance, but withhold it when there exist 
multiple, seemingly distinct, early printings. We no longer feel entitled to consider the 
Hamlet found in Q1 to be the same as the Hamlet found in Q2 or in F, and hence the 
new Arden3 edition of the play contains edited texts of all three versions 
(Shakespeare 2006a; Shakespeare 2006b). And yet we treat the Hamlet at the end 
of the play (in each version) as effectively the same as the Hamlet at the beginning, 
despite him having quite a different outlook and, as Roger Lewis pointed out, having 
answered his own question "To be or not to be" (3.1.58) with a definitive and 
conclusive "Let be" (Lewis 1978; Shakespeare 1604-5, N3v). This might well be 
considered something of a contradiction, and perhaps we should draw an analogy 
with our habitual refusal to construct a different person to account for how the 
character has altered over the course of the play (and we do not, as Dennett 
showed, do that with real people either) in order to say that we will not construct a 
different play each time we come across a variant version. The difficulty lies in 
overdetermination. There are two ways that a singular text may become a pair of 
variant texts, by revision or by corruption, and although either is sufficient to explain 
variation both may be operating as the cause of difference between two versions of a 
play. The problem was neatly stated by John Jowett, who observed that we used to 
think that Q1 and Folio King Lear were imperfect witnesses to a singular antecedent 
authorial version, and now we are in danger of deluding ourselves that they are 
perfect witnesses to two equally viable authorial versions, but in fact the truth lies 
between these positions: authorial revision and corruption separate these printings 
(Jowett 2007, 3). 
    Assuming that corruption will always be present in the printing of early-modern 
plays, how high should we set the threshold for variation before we say that revision 
must also be brought in as an explanation? In a preface to Blackmore's book on 
memes, Dawkins gave a cogent reason for distinguishing between variations that 
matter and those that do not, using Blackmore's distinction of reproductions that 
copy-the-product and those (much more important, and mostly human) imitations 
that copy-the-instructions. Imagine a Japanese master carpenter teaching an English 
apprentice: 
The apprentice would not copy obvious mistakes. If the master hit his thumb with a 
hammer, the apprentice would correctly guess, even without understanding the 
Japanese expletive '** **** **!', that he meant to hit the nail. He would not make a 
Lamarckian copy of the precise details of every hammer blow, but copy instead the 
inferred Weismannian instruction: drive the nail in with as many blows of your 
hammer as it takes your arm to achieve the same idealized end result as the master 
achieved with his--a nail head flush with the wood. (Blackmore 1999, 12) 
This is pure Platonism, even down to the use of an analogy from woodwork, allied 
with a view of genetics that rightly dispenses with Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck's notion 
of inheritance--that each generation's particularities (the ironsmith's large biceps, the 
bicycle-courier's powerful calves) are passed on to descendents--in favour of August 
Weismann's assertion of the continuity of the germ line: your genes are not, in fact, 
altered by your behaviour. Just as the apprentice copies not the master's actual 
practice but what is inferred to be the ideal behind it, so in genetic reproduction the 
'recipe' for an organism, not a particular reading of that 'recipe' (the phenotype or 
bodily particularities) is what is passed on. 
    A version of this distinction was clearly in Philip Sidney's mind when he responded 
to Plato's famous attack on visual and poetic art, which attack claimed that because 
any real-world object, say a bed, is only an imitation of a perfect Idea or Form of 
'bed-ness', a painting of, or a poem about, a bed necessarily is only an imitation of 
an imitation (Plato 1941, 10:595a-608b, pp. 314-32). According to Sidney, ". . .  the 
skill of ech Artificer standeth in that Idea, or fore conceit of the worke, and not in the 
worke itself". Through imitating the idea, not the actual behaviour, the prentice may 
surpass the master and the poet can make "things either better than nature bringeth 
foorth, or quite a new, formes such as neuer were in nature" (Sidney 1595, C1r). 
Using Blackmore's example, we may notice that a person's recipe for a new soup 
could be disseminated by repeated imitation of the soup by those who tasted it 
(Lamarckian, copy-the-product dissemination), in which case slight alterations might 
accumulate quite quickly as each chef chooses to add more salt (Blackmore 1999, 
60-61). But if the recipe circled the world as a text on the Internet, such local 
variations would not accumulate because the text (like the germ line, DNA) is not 
altered by the variations (thus Weismannnian, copy-the-instructions dissemination). 
The analogy works well for Shakespeare: most of the early textual reproduction was 
monogenetic (Q1 was copy for Q2, which was copy for Q3 and so on) and, now that 
the memorial reconstruction theory is largely discredited (in which theory actors 
created a complete script by recalling their individual lines), we can say that there 
was relatively little copy-the-product dissemination. 
    If we think the Dawkins/Blackmore/Dennett line on Platonism and the 
dissemination of cultural knowledge is reasonable in its distinction between 
variations that matter and those that do not, and if we think that human character is 
an example of where we should permit considerable latitude (such as variations of 
behaviour and beliefs) before we conclude that we are dealing with more than one 
person, there seems little reason to accept the current textual theorizing that finds in 
each textual variant (apart from those that are egregious errors) the branching off of 
a new version of the play. Recast in terms of human labour, playwrighting tends 
towards the singular not the plural and to accord a distinct line to each textualization 
that happens to survive is as mistaken as asserting that there is no singularity called 
Coca-Cola because (contrary to the corporation's official line) we know that its 
sweetness is varied when it is sold in different markets across the world. It is true 
that we do not possess a manuscript recipe for Shakespeare's Hamlet, only three 
copies of it that differ markedly. But we are entitled to treat these as three 
approximations of one thing, the Platonic ideal of Hamlet as it existed (in material 
form, as configurations of neurons) in the mind of Shakespeare. If, over time, 
Shakespeare changed his mind about Hamlet, it is still conceptually Hamlet even if a 
text closely representing the conceptual state at time T1 is quite different from a text 
closely representing the conceptual state at time T2. 
    It is not that there was actually a pure and unembodied form of the play in the 
mind of Shakespeare and that all textualizations are fallings-off from this perfected 
state. Ideas are not quite like that. According to Dennett, even in our minds 
experiences and intentions exist in multiple and inchoate forms, never coming 
together at one place (the now-dismissed Cartesian Theatre): 
We don't directly experience what happens on our retinas, in our ears, on the surface 
of our skin. What we actually experience is a product of many processes of 
interpretation--editorial processes, in effect. They take in relatively raw and one-
sided representations, and yield collated, revised, enhanced representations, and 
they take place in the streams of activity occurring in various parts of the brain. 
(Dennett 1993, 112) 
The written state of the plays existing in multiple textualizations has an analogy in 
the neurological state inside our heads, the 'multiple-drafts' model of consciousness. 
The feeling that the experiences and intentions adhere together, are coherent and 
persistent over time, comes from the combination of memes that we call 
consciousness: the simplified version of oneself that the various modules of the brain 
collectively generate for the purpose of managing the whole. (A useful analogy would 
be the 'My Computer' icon that the Microsoft Windows operating system presents to 
its user: like the Cartesian homuncule this exists within the hardware that it purports 
to represent, and it hides from the user the messy detail of the modules that make 
the real system.) The editorial work performed by the mind to generate and 
perpetuate the useful fiction of me (to me) or you (to you) is precisely like the 
editorial work formerly undertaken by editors to generate and perpetuate the useful 
fiction of a singular, coherent Shakespeare play for his readership and theatre 
practitioners. As that singularity and coherence breaks down in modern editorial 
practice, the plays become at worst impossible to speak of at all, or at best they 
become identified with, and constrained by, their extant early textualizations. This is 
not how Shakespeare would have thought of them, nor how the early actors would 
have thought of them, because it is not really how the human mind works. Conflating 
multiple drafts to create usable fictions of self, of textuality, of existence, are what our 
minds have evolved to do. 
Notes 
1 All quotations of plays are from Shakespeare 1989 unless otherwise stated. 
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